How big is too big? The question
is of growing concern to investors in those private equity funds that are
targeting ever-larger prey. The past two years has seen a string of mammoth
leveraged buyouts in the United States and Europe, some of which have begun to
aspire to the girth of the archetypical mega-LBO, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts’ $31.3
billion acquisition of tobacco and cracker giant RJR Nabisco in 1988. The
current glut of private equity capital combined with reasonable public market
valuations and target companies’ desire to shuck off onerous public market
requirements, such as those mandated by Sarbanes Oxley, have all contributed to
the supersizing of the LBO world.
But RJR Nabisco is remembered both for its size and its
disappointing performance. The company languished for several years despite
KKR’s attempts to energize it. After spinning off its tobacco business, KKR
disposed of the remaining bits in 2005. Whether the large LBOs being arranged
today will perform any better is an open question, especially since they have an
additional element of risk: The largest transactions today are typically backed
by consortia of private equity firms.
TOP VIEW: Many of the leveraged buyouts of extremely large companies such as SunGard, Hertz and GMAC in the
United States and Europe have been sponsored by consortia of private equity
firms. These transactions carry the novel risk that a consortium’s members–who
otherwise face off in heated competitions for the best assets–may have a falling
out over strategic or administrative aspects of a deal. But specialists say the
real problem with these transactions is the difficulty their sponsors face
getting large, often mature companies to grow at the rapid clip their investors
expect. | In 2005, a group of eight leading private equity houses,
including Silver Lake Partners and The Blackstone Group, purchased SunGard Data
Systems, a financial technology company, for $11.3 billion. The deal was topped
shortly thereafter by a consortium consisting of The Carlyle Group, Clayton,
Dubilier & Rice and Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity, which bought Hertz
for $15 billion. A host of similar, though often smaller, deals has closed in
the past two years.
The investment guidelines of most private equity funds prohibit them from
putting more than a predetermined percentage of their assets in any one
transaction, primarily to avoid exposing investors to the risk of
overconcentration. For transactions measured in the billions of dollars, even the largest funds may be forced to ally
themselves with rivals in order to aggregate enough equity capital. These Brobdingnagian private equity deals are leading private
investors and family offices into uncharted territory. Those that have channeled
money into the popular private equity funds of funds may already have exposure
to megadeals, or will as the transactions proliferate. Investors need to weigh
how their risk-and-reward landscape differs from more traditional, smaller
private equity fund exposures (and from direct exposure to particular buyouts).
They must determine the return potential of these leviathans–essentially,
whether such large and established companies can be substantially improved
within private equity investment timeframes. "Just as there will be failures of smaller transactions that no
one will ever hear about, there are going to be some failures of these mega
transactions, but they will be highly publicized," says Tony Rickert,
Washington-based chair of the U.S. private equity practice group at DLA Piper
Rudnick Gray Cary. He adds that the failures of large and small deals will arise
for the same reasons: "Overpaying for a company; not anticipating its problems;
borrowing too much money; and not having enough cushion between the amount of
debt you borrow and what you pay for the company to be able to work your way out
of a problem." Small Triumphs The risk of actual loss, versus the risk of underperformance,
may differ from smaller transactions, Rickert says. "I think the risk of losing
your principal is either the same or slightly less with these mega transactions,
but I think the jury is still out on the risk that you will not make as much
upside as you had hoped. I believe it is more difficult with the mega companies
to create additional growth, which is the basis for profitability and increasing
the value of your investment." This, Rickert argues, is because larger companies generally
have more stable cash flows than their smaller counterparts. Their big balance
sheets, along with their generally more diversified operations, mean they can
weather economic imbalances more easily than the smaller businesses. "The
large-cap companies can withstand the bumps in the road. Losing a major
customer, for instance, could have a large impact on a smaller company, but a
larger company can withstand the volatility," says James McGovern, managing
director at private equity investment advisory firm Franklin Park, based in
Philadelphia.
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