Now the same thing is true in
venture capital as an industry, but I think within venture capital, returns are
quite differentiated. The returns historically have been 35 percent annualized
for the 90th percentile and something like 10 percent annualized for the 50th.
So it’s an incredible delta between the top and the average people. You don’t
have such a delta in the private equity world, which is why, if the average
returns go down, it’s likely they won’t be good anywhere.What would bring private equity returns back? We are probably going to have 10, 15, 20 years of lots of capital chasing
returns that are not great. I don’t think that this is an acute issue that’s
going to get fixed quickly, like it was in the late 1980s, when you had a
similar problem solved by a massive downturn, so that four or five years later
you could resume investing. Nothing of the sort has happened today. The
venture capital industry is a great example. In 2000, I would have said there’s
this massive overhang of venture capitalists; a lot of them are going to go out
of business, and a few years down the line, venture capital will be a good thing
to invest in again. But nothing of the sort happened; they just stayed around
and raised lots of money. So I think we’re dealing with an overhang that’s going
to be with us for many years.
Why did the overhang persist despite the
dot-com crash? The way to see the housing slowdown is as a deflationary shock. When the
bubble ends, it’s like the ATM machine in everybody’s house gets turned off. | Part of what’s driving the overhang is the baby boomers’ need to save for
retirement. The savings rate in the U.S. at this point is at 0 percent. But we
already have an overhang because of high levels of savings in China and Japan
and growing levels in Europe. Now, the savings rate in the U.S. is going to
start going up, a lot, and I don’t think it is going to come down elsewhere.
Say you want to earn 70 percent of your pre-retirement income in retirement.
How much do you need to save? The answer is very sensitive to the return you can
expect to make. But even if you expect returns of something like 5 percent after
inflation, which is quite high historically, the U.S. would have to save about
10 percent more of its GDP than it does now. Basically $1 trillion a year would
have to shift from consumption toward savings. You could argue the shift
actually has to be even bigger than that, because if you have $1 trillion going
into savings out of consumption, investment returns will go down. The
equilibrium savings point will be incredibly high. When do you see this shift filtering through to asset prices? This is the question I spend a lot of time thinking about on the hedge fund
side. One big new idea that we’ve had over the last few months is that one of
the main sources of global liquidity driving asset prices today is the rise in
oil prices and the petrodollar recycling effect.
The rise in oil is like a $1
trillion per year regressive sales tax on the middle class, which would
otherwise spend that money on consumption. The money goes primarily to very
wealthy people in Russia, Saudi Arabia and various other places. And they invest
it. Now, normally, if you had a $1 trillion sales tax, it would be bad for
stocks. But what would happen if the government took the money and used it to
invest in the equity markets? Our analysis shows that the net effect is the
markets actually go up. So the financial petrodollar effect so far is dominating
the real effect of the higher oil prices. What would disrupt this capital flow? I think there is a point where higher interest rates may break the cycle. You
shouldn’t underestimate central bank monetary policy. But the question really is
what happens with oil. If oil prices stay where they are, I think the
petrodollar effect could go on for quite a while. One really big question
is what would happen if the price of oil fell sharply. All of a sudden there
would be no petrodollars supporting the financial markets.
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