Serious hurdles to further
consolidation remain, however. Both industry and government are reluctant to
break out of domestic comfort zones. Industry complains about lack of
opportunity in international markets, and governments seek to protect their
domestic industrial bases—in particular by applying the U.S. trade control
regime, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Since 9/11, industry and
international governments have seen these guidelines as a massive hindrance to
defense transactions. An Army War College report published in April 2005, The
Transatlantic Industrial Base: Restructuring Scenarios and Their Implications,
states: “The environment for consolidating a transatlantic defense industrial
base is currently being poisoned by some U.S. politicians who seem to be going
out of their way to antagonize European countries and their defense
firms.”To no one’s surprise, the business of defense often centers more on
politics than on free-market principles. The reality, however, is that there is
significant opportunity for governments to seek out foreign technology and for
industry to enter and expand into new markets. Although far smaller than BAE
Systems’ United Defense Industries acquisition, recent U.S. successes in the
European market include L-3’s 2006 purchase of Advanced Systems Architectures, a
UK systems engineering and software developer; Lockheed Martin’s 2005
acquisition of Insys, a UK IT firm; and General Dynamics’ 2001 purchase of Santa
Barbara Sistemas, a Spanish vehicle manufacturer. TOP VIEW To exploit lucrative markets and ensure future growth, arms manufacturers in
the United States and Europe are looking to forge alliances, or even merge
with counterparts across the Atlantic. While the potential benefit to each side
is clear, serious political obstacles to transatlantic consolidation remain.
Those companies that tread carefully and establish a foothold in niche
industries will overcome this resistance and eventually gain much greater access
to foreign markets. |
BAE Systems began an
acquisition process in the United States in the late 1980s, with the firm
focused on increasing its U.S. capabilities while minimizing regulatory
oversight and complaints from the U.S industrial base. Over several years, it
was able to build critical mass in the military support services market until it
became the largest engineering support provider to the U.S. Navy. With this
critical momentum, BAE Systems was then able to acquire Lockheed Martin
Aerospace Electronics Systems for $1.67 billion in 2000. This move proved quite
the coup at the time because Lockheed’s division was involved in a number of
classified high-tech military programs. The ultimate success of BAE System’s
acquisition strategy in the U.S. came in March 2005, when the company acquired
United Defense Industries for $4.2 billion. Over the past decade, we have
seen growth in acquisitions based on a greater need for foreign technology,
integration and investment. This trend is almost certain to continue and may
ultimately lead to more significant acquisitions outside of the recent successes
of BAE Systems. Joint ventures, however, will likely be limited to less
sensitive markets and legacy technologies, such as off-the-shelf communications
equipment, noncombat vehicles and training and simulation systems. Acquirers
will also target professional services such as engineering support, logistics,
maintenance and IT management. Restless in Washington Three primary
drivers will affect international market access in a positive way. First,
transnational alliances are breaking up or are being relegated back to their
constituent firms. Alenia Marconi, a 1998 defense electronics partnership
between BAE Systems and Finmeccanica, dissolved in 2005. Astrium, a
space-systems joint venture between BAE Systems and EADS formed in 2000, was
bought by EADS in 2003. The disappearance of these alliances and others like
them will spur global defense firms to further acquire and consolidate in order
to reopen market access that these alliances once offered.
| In the near term, most European firms will experience some opposition
and will be limited to U.S. entry strategies based on alliances,partnerships and smaller tactical acquisitions. | The second driver
toward increased cooperation has been growing—albeit slowly—support from the
U.S. government. Despite public rhetoric to the contrary, senior officials have
expressed support for greater cooperation. At a 2006 roundtable in Brussels,
sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Colonel Michael
Ryan, a representative of the Defense Secretary’s Mission to the EU, said that a
“needs-based approach would drive the [U.S. and European] allies to buy the best
product on the transatlantic market at the best price, regardless of its point
of origin.” Both the secretary’s office and pro-trade members of Congress have
complained about the seemingly glacial pace of international alliance building.
While most insiders at the Defense Department will not publicly demand greater
cooperation, they feel frustrated that current efforts are no more than “studies
of studies” with no viable and comprehensive solutions being brought to the
table.
The final key driver will be the success of proper acquisition
strategies. While new markets beckon to companies bent on consolidation, overtly
aggressive acquisition techniques will raise red flags with regulators and
defense industry executives who are likely to fight for important base markets
both in the U.S. and overseas. The path to success requires a slow pace and
patience with acquisitions in markets not as attractive to domestic industries.
Most of the purchases of the past several years were small, and therefore
did not prompt significant regulatory scrutiny. The acquisitions also tended
to be vertical rather than horizontal, focusing on stable market growth. BAE
Systems proved this strategy extremely successful. A long-term market commitment
with an escalating acquisition strategy has put BAE Systems on even footing with
other large U.S. defense firms.
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